Number of co-authors:8
Number of publications with 3 favourite co-authors:Seonyoung Shim:2Myungsin Chae:1Eunjin Kim:1
Byungtae Lee's 3 most productive colleagues in number of publications:Andrew B. Whinston:48Anitesh Barua:5Byungjoon Yoo:3
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Publications by Byungtae Lee (bibliography)
Kim, Eunjin and Lee, Byungtae (2009): Strategic Use of Analytical CRM in a Market with Network Effects and Switching Costs: Terminating Unprofitable Customer Relationships. In Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce, 19 (3) pp. 153-172. Available online
Analytical customer relationship management (CRM) systems make firms more informed than ever about their customers. This further gives firms the ability to serve customers selectively in a way that ensures retaining profitable customers and eliminating unprofitable ones. However, when firms of products/services with network effects decide to eliminate unprofitable customers, they may face the risk associated with firing them, which is user-based shrinkage. This risk incurred as a result of network effects has been widely neglected in CRM literature. In this study, considering this risk, we investigate when firms can eliminate unprofitable customers in the competitive market with network effects and consumer switching costs, which often co-exist with network effects, using a game-theoretic model of a duopoly. Our results show that it is not desirable for firms to fire unprofitable customers in the presence of strong network effects or sufficiently low consumer-switching costs. Otherwise, firms can fire unprofitable customers and benefit from the ability to eliminate them. An interesting point is that competing firms can be better off when both have the ability to eliminate unprofitable customers in the presence of moderate switching costs and small network effects.
© All rights reserved Kim and Lee and/or Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
Lee, Byungtae and Yoo, Byungjoon (2007): What Prevents Electronic Lemon Markets?. In Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce, 17 (3) pp. 217-246. Available online
It is well known that the "lemon" problem can cause market failure. Because difficulties in quality discovery of nonstandardized and complex products will increase transaction costs, it was predicted that the "electronic market" would prevail only with less complex and more standardized goods. However, it has been observed that there are many successful electronic (auction) markets for seemingly typical "lemon" goods such as used cars, raw minerals, and agricultural products. It is argued that in such markets, the equilibrium price of electronic trading appeared higher than in the nonelectronic market. Many speculative explanations have been offered for this, but to the best of our knowledge, no analytical studies have been presented. This study is an attempt to fill this gap. In this paper, we look at the problem of quality discovery in the electronic trading of physical goods especially when the goods are not standardized. The information asymmetry between buyer and seller creates the possibility of a "lemon" in the nonstandardized market. To mitigate this problem, several auction markets have devised third party quality grading systems and limited auctions to only relatively higher quality products. Through analytical modeling, we rationalize these mechanisms; that is, the intervention of an impartial third party for quality inspection, market segmentation by quality measure, and the sellers' willingness to pay the cost of quality inspection.
© All rights reserved Lee and Yoo and/or Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
Chae, Myungsin, Shim, Seonyoung, Cho, Hyungjun and Lee, Byungtae (2007): An Empirical Analysis of Fraud Detection in Online Auctions: Credit Card Phantom Transaction. In: HICSS 2007 - 40th Hawaii International International Conference on Systems Science 3-6 January, 2007, Waikoloa, Big Island, HI, USA. p. 155. Available online
Shim, Seonyoung and Lee, Byungtae (2006): Evolution of portals and stability of information ecology on the web. In: Fox, Mark S. and Spencer, Bruce (eds.) Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Electronic Commerce - ICEC 2006 2006, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada. pp. 584-588. Available online
Ravindran, Suryanarayanan, Barua, Anitesh, Lee, Byungtae and Whinston, Andrew B. (1996): Strategies for Smart Shopping in Cyberspace. In Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce, 6 (1) pp. 33-50.
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