Number of co-authors:21
Number of publications with 3 favourite co-authors:Hao Xu:Karthik Kannan:Ramayya Krishnan:
Rahul Telang's 3 most productive colleagues in number of publications:Robert E. Kraut:98Robert J. Kauffman:64Lorrie Faith Crano..:44
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Publications by Rahul Telang (bibliography)
Wattal, Sunil, Telang, Rahul and Mukhopadhyay, Tridas (2009): Information Personalization in a Two Dimensional Product Differentiation Model: Impact of Market Structure and the Quality-Fit Ratio. In: HICSS 2009 - 42st Hawaii International International Conference on Systems Science 5-8 January, 2009, Waikoloa, Big Island, HI, USA. pp. 1-10. Available online
Kraut, Robert E., Sunder, Shyam, Telang, Rahul and Morris, James (2005): Pricing Electronic Mail to Solve the Problem of Spam. In Human-Computer Interaction, 20 (1) pp. 195-223. Available online
Junk e-mail or spam is rapidly choking off e-mail as a reliable and efficient means of communication over the Internet. Although the demand for human attention increases rapidly with the volume of information and communication, the supply of attention hardly changes. Markets are a social institution for efficiently allocating supply and demand of scarce resources. Charging a price for sending messages may help discipline senders from demanding more attention than they are willing to pay for. Price may also credibly inform recipients about the value of a message to the sender before they read it. This article examines economic approaches to the problem of spam and the results of two laboratory experiments to explore the consequences of a pricing system for electronic mail. Charging postage for e-mail causes senders to be more selective and to send fewer messages. However, recipients did not interpret the postage paid by senders as a signal of the importance of the messages. These results suggest that markets for attention have the potential for addressing the problem of spam but their design needs further development and testing.
© All rights reserved Kraut et al. and/or Taylor and Francis
Ghose, Anindya, Telang, Rahul and Krishnan, Ramayya (2005): Welfare Implications of Secondary Electronic Markets. In: HICSS 2005 - 38th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 3-6 January, 2005, Big Island, HI, USA. . Available online
Kannan, Karthik, Telang, Rahul and Xu, Hao (2004): Economic Analysis of the Market for Software Vulnerability Disclosure. In: HICSS 2004 2004. . Available online
Krishnan, Ramayya, Smith, Michael D., Tang, Zhulei and Telang, Rahul (2004): The Impact of Free-Riding on Peer-to-Peer Networks. In: HICSS 2004 2004. . Available online
Mukhopadhyay, Tridas, Rajan, Uday and Telang, Rahul (2004): Competition between Internet Search Engines. In: HICSS 2004 2004. . Available online
Sadeh, Norman M., Dively, Mary Jo, Kauffman, Robert J., Labrou, Yannis, Shehory, Onn, Telang, Rahul and Cranor, Lorrie Faith (eds.) Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Electronic Commerce - ICEC 2003 September 30 - October 03, 2003, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA.
Kraut, Robert E., Morris, James H., Telang, Rahul, Filer, Darrin, Cronin, Matt and Sunder, Shyam (2002): Markets for attention: will postage for email help?. In: Churchill, Elizabeth F., McCarthy, Joe, Neuwirth, Christine and Rodden, Tom (eds.) Proceedings of the 2002 ACM conference on Computer supported cooperative work November 16 - 20, 2002, New Orleans, Louisiana, USA. pp. 206-215. Available online
Balancing the needs of information distributors and their audiences has
grown harder in the age of the Internet. While the demand for attention
continues to increase rapidly with the volume of information and communication,
the supply of human attention is relatively fixed. Markets are a social
institution for efficiently balancing supply and demand of scarce resources.
Charging a price for sending messages may help discipline senders from
demanding more attention than they are willing to pay for. Price may also help
recipients estimate the value of a message before reading it. We report the
results of two laboratory experiments to explore the consequences of a pricing
system for electronic mail. Charging postage for email causes senders to be
more selective and send fewer messages. However, recipients did not use the
postage paid by senders as a signal of importance. These studies suggest
markets for attention have potential, but their design needs more work.
© All rights reserved Kraut et al. and/or ACM Press
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