Number of co-authors:10
Number of publications with 3 favourite co-authors:Stephen M. Fiore:2Dan Zahavi:2Tom Froese:1
Shaun Gallagher's 3 most productive colleagues in number of publications:Stephen M. Fiore:21Patricia Bockelman..:5Jonathan Streater:3
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Personal Homepage: http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~gallaghr
Current place of employment: Department of Philosophy, University of Central Florida
Shaun Gallagher is the Lillian and Morrie Moss Professor of Excellence in Philosophy at the University of Memphis. He has a secondary appointment at the University of Hertfordshire (UK) and is Honorary Professor of Philosophy at the University of Copenhagen (Denmark). He's held visiting positions at the Cognition and Brain Science MRC Unit at the University of Cambridge, the Ecole Normale Supériure in Lyon, and the Centre de Recherche en Epistémologie Appliquée (CREA), Paris, and he is currently Visiting Fellow at the Kolleg-Forschergruppe Bildakt und Verkörperung at Humboldt University, Berlin. He holds the Humboldt Foundation Anneliese Maier Research Fellowship (2012-17) and is PI on grants to conduct research on intersubjectivity and institutions (Marie Curie Foundation) and the aesthetic and spiritual experiences of astronauts during space travel (Templeton Foundation). His publications include How the Body Shapes the Mind (Oxford, 2005); The Phenomenological Mind (with Dan Zahavi, Routledge, 2008), and as editor, the Oxford Handbook of the Self (Oxford, 2011). He’s editor-in-chief of the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
Publications by Shaun Gallagher (bibliography)
Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan (2012): The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science, 2nd edition. Routledge
The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: What is phenomenology? naturalizing phenomenology and the empirical cognitive sciences phenomenology and consciousness consciousness and self-consciousness, including perception and action time and consciousness, including William James intentionality the embodied mind action knowledge of other minds situated and extended minds phenomenology and personal identity Interesting and important examples are used throughout, including phantom limb syndrome, blindsight and self-disorders in schizophrenia, making The Phenomenological Mind an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science and philosophy of mind.
© All rights reserved Gallagher and Zahavi and/or Routledge
Gallagher, Shaun (2012). [Title to be defined - in press]. Retrieved 24 May 2013 from [URL to be defined - in press]
Elias, John Z., Morrow, Patricia Bockelman, Streater, Jonathan, Gallagher, Shaun and Fiore, Stephen M. (2011): Towards Triadic Interactions in Autism and Beyond: Transitional Objects, Joint Attention, and Social Robotics. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 55th Annual Meeting 2011. pp. 1486-1490.
The concept of transitional objects from the British Object Relations school of psychoanalysis may offer insight into the affective aspects of the development of dyadic and triadic interactions. Furthermore the concept may be applied to the use of social robotics in autism research and therapy, with social robots in these settings perhaps functioning as transitional objects for autistic children. Possible applications in organizational contexts are suggested as well, along with considerations of future research relating transitional objects to the notions of primary and secondary intersubjectivity.
© All rights reserved Elias et al. and/or HFES
Gallagher, Shaun (2010). [Title to be defined - in press]. Retrieved 24 May 2013 from [URL to be defined - in press]
Froese, Tom and Gallagher, Shaun (2010): Phenomenology and Artificial Life: Toward a Technological Supplementation of Phenomenological Methodology. In Husserl Studies, 26 (2) pp. 83-106.
The invention of the computer has revolutionized science. With respect to finding the essential structures of life, for example, it has enabled scientists not only to investigate empirical examples, but also to create and study novel hypothetical variations by means of simulation: life as it could be. We argue that this kind of research in the field of artificial life, namely the specification, implementation and evaluation of artificial systems, is akin to Husserls method of free imaginative variation as applied to the specific regional ontology of biology. Thus, at a time when the clarification of the essence of our biological embodiment is of growing interest for phenomenology, we suggest that artificial life should be seen as a method of externalizing some of the insurmountable complexity of imaginatively varying the phenomenon of life.
© All rights reserved Froese and Gallagher and/or their publisher
Jaegher, Hanne De, Paolo, Ezequiel A. Di and Gallagher, Shaun (2010): Can social interaction constitute social cognition?. In Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14 (10) pp. 441-447.
An important shift is taking place in social cognition research, away from a focus on the individual mind and toward embodied and participatory aspects of social understanding. Empirical results already imply that social cognition is not reducible to the workings of individual cognitive mechanisms. To galvanize this interactive turn, we provide an operational definition of social interaction and distinguish the different explanatory roles - contextual, enabling and constitutive - it can play in social cognition. We show that interactive processes are more than a context for social cognition: they can complement and even replace individual mechanisms. This new explanatory power of social interaction can push the field forward by expanding the possibilities of scientific explanation beyond the individual.
© All rights reserved Jaegher et al. and/or Elsevier Ltd
Chertoff, Dustin B., Vanderbleek, Sandy, Fiore, Stephen M. and Gallagher, Shaun (2009): Cognitive architecture for perception-reaction intelligent computer agents (CAPRICA). In: Proceedings of the 4th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human Robot Interaction 2009. pp. 241-242.
In this paper, we introduce a cognitive agent architecture that can be used in the study of Human-Robot Interaction. The Cognitive Architecture for Perception-Reaction Intelligent Computer Agents (CAPRICA) is an extensible agent library built around the ideas of theory of mind, episodic memory, and embodied cognition. Existing agent research in each of these areas was used to formulate design requirements. We provide an overview of the library's design and discuss future work in progress.
© All rights reserved Chertoff et al. and/or ACM Press
Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan (2008): The Phenomenological Mind. London, Routledge
Gallagher, Shaun (2008): Brainstorming: Views and Interviews on the Mind. Exeter, Imprint Academic
Gallagher, Shaun (2007): Social cognition and social robots. In Social Cognition, 3 (3) pp. 435-453.
Social robots are robots designed to interact with humans or with each other in ways that approximate human social interaction. It seems clear that one question relevant to the project of designing such robots concerns how humans themselves interact to achieve social understanding. If we turn to psychology, philosophy, or the cognitive sciences in general, we find two models of social cognition vying for dominance under the heading of theory of mind: theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). It is therefore natural and interesting to ask how a TT design for a social robot would differ from the ST version. I think that a much more critical question is whether either TT or ST provide an adequate explanation of social cognition. There is a growing although still minority consensus that, despite their dominance in the debate about social cognition, neither TT nor ST, nor some hybrid version of these theories, offers an acceptable account of how we encounter and interact with one another. In this paper I will give a brief review of the theory of mind debate, outline an alternative theory of social cognition based on an embodied interactive approach, and then try to draw out a few implications about social robotics. ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR Copyright of Pragmatics&Cognition is the property of John Benjamins Publishing Co. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s)
© All rights reserved Gallagher and/or John Benjamins Publishing Co
Gallagher, Shaun (2006): How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford University Press, USA
How the Body Shapes the Mind is an interdisciplinary work that addresses philosophical questions by appealing to evidence found in experimental psychology, neuroscience, studies of pathologies, and developmental psychology. There is a growing consensus across these disciplines that the contribution of embodiment to cognition is inescapable. Because this insight has been developed across a variety of disciplines, however, there is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neuroscience, behavioral expressions in psychology, design concerns in artificial intelligence and robotics, and debates about embodied experience in the phenomenology and philosophy of mind. Shaun Gallagher's book aims to contribute to the formulation of that common vocabulary and to develop a conceptual framework that will avoid both the overly reductionistic approaches that explain everything in terms of bottom-up neuronal mechanisms, and inflationistic approaches that explain everything in terms of Cartesian, top-down cognitive states. Gallagher pursues two basic sets of questions. The first set consists of questions about the phenomenal aspects of the structure of experience, and specifically the relatively regular and constant features that we find in the content of our experience. If throughout conscious experience there is a constant reference to one's own body, even if this is a recessive or marginal awareness, then that reference constitutes a structural feature of the phenomenal field of consciousness, part of a framework that is likely to determine or influence all other aspects of experience. The second set of questions concerns aspects of the structure of experience that are more hidden, those that may be more difficult to get at because they happen before we know it. They do not normally enter into the content of experience in an explicit way, and are often inaccessible to reflective consciousness. To what extent, and in what ways, are consciousness and cognitive processes, which include experiences related to perception, memory, imagination, belief, judgment, and so forth, shaped or structured by the fact that they are embodied in this way?
© All rights reserved Gallagher and/or Oxford University Press, USA
Gallagher, Shaun (2005): How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford, UK, Clarendon Press
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