Publication statistics

Pub. period:1987-2011
Pub. count:20
Number of co-authors:34



Co-authors

Number of publications with 3 favourite co-authors:

Michael S. Wogalter:5
Kent P. Vaubel:5
Stephen L. Young:4

 

 

Productive colleagues

Kenneth R. Laughery's 3 most productive colleagues in number of publications:

Michael S. Wogalte..:60
Michael J. Kalsher:20
Lila Laux:12
 
 
 
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Kenneth R. Laughery

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Publications by Kenneth R. Laughery (bibliography)

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2011
 
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Laughery, Kenneth R., Wogalter, Michael S., Nemire, Kenneth E., Vredenburgh, Alison G. and Kalsher, Michael J. (2011): What Do Human Factors/Ergonomics Experts Have to Tell Juries That They Don't Know -- But May Think They Know?. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 55th Annual Meeting 2011. pp. 604-607.

Product liability and personal injury litigation frequently involves circumstances where an injury or property damage occurred as humans were interacting with products and/or environments while performing some task. Human Factors/Ergonomics (HFE) professionals are often involved as experts in these cases. The question addressed here is what benefits do juries derive from HFE expert testimony. In this session five panelists with experience as expert witnesses each describe a case that illustrates HFE testimony. Examples of issues addressed are sensory/perceptual limitations, attention capture and capacity, and induced errors. The presentations focus on issues where expert testimony would likely benefit jury understanding technical topics about which jurors may know little about or have misconceptions.

© All rights reserved Laughery et al. and/or HFES

1995
 
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Laughery, Kenneth R., Lovvoll, David R. and Wogalter, Michael S. (1995): Allocation of Responsibility for Product Safety. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 39th Annual Meeting 1995. pp. 435-439.

Three studies were carried out to explore how people allocate responsibility for safety during product use. In Study 1 29 consumer products were named and subjects apportioned safety responsibility to the manufacturer, the retailer, the user, and a potentially relevant organization not in the stream of commerce (e.g., FDA, CPSC, Underwriters Laboratories). The mean percent responsibility

© All rights reserved Laughery et al. and/or Human Factors Society

 
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Bogner, Marilyn Sue, Weinger, Matthew B., Bogner, Sue, Laughery, Kenneth R., Amundson, Dennis E., Weinger, Matthew B. and Haas, Ellen (1995): Warnings in Medicine. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 39th Annual Meeting 1995. .

 
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Young, Stephen L., Wogalter, Michael S., Laughery, Kenneth R., Magurno, Amy and Lovvoll, David (1995): Relative Order and Space Allocation of Message Components in Hazard Warning Signs. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 39th Annual Meeting 1995. pp. 969-973.

Standards, guidelines, and research findings suggest that safety signs should generally contain four components: signal word, hazard, consequence and instruction statements. The purpose of this research is to determine the relative importance of different safety sign components. Two experiments examined this issue by having subjects construct a set of warning signs from component sections. In Experiment 1, participants manipulated component sections and assembled them onto a metal plate (of limited size). In Experiment 2, subjects worked with a technician to produce the signs on a computer. The relative importance of the individual components was determined by examining (1) use vs. omission rates, (2) size, and (3) order. The results show that few subjects used all the components in their warnings. Participants enlarged certain statements (Experiment 1) or added pictorials (Experiment 2) which necessitated the omission of other, presumably less-important, elements. The order of sign components was consistent only for signal words, which were placed generally at the top. The results suggest that, for certain hazards, the overall quality of information conveyed by a sign might be improved by eliminating or making smaller less important information, while simultaneously increasing the size of more relevant verbal information (or adding pictorials).

© All rights reserved Young et al. and/or Human Factors Society

 
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Rhoades, Timothy P., Frantz, J. Paul, Horst, Donald P., Laughery, Kenneth R. and Purswell, Jerry L. (1995): Examining the Value of Expert Testimony Regarding Warnings. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 39th Annual Meeting 1995. p. 1064.

This alternative format session is designed to examine the value of expert testimony related to warnings. Specific objectives of the session include informing HFES members of the views of some members of the legal community who question the value and appropriateness of expert testimony regarding warnings; identifying appropriate responses to such positions; discussing the basic role that experts play in assisting the litigation process; and describing and discussing the perceptions and experiences of HFES members regarding the value of their activities in forensic matters. This session begins with a brief description of articles authored by an attorney, William Hardie, whose position is summarized by the following statement: "The defendant should try to exclude all opinion evidence on warnings, leaving the evaluation of the warnings to the jury and lawyer's arguments.... The legal principles applicable to liability for failure to warn were developed by courts without the benefit of communication theorists. These legal principles are based on common sense, fairness, and the knowledge of ordinary people. In this spirit, juries are not well served by witnesses who are nothing more than professional advocates." (Hardie, 1991) Session participants will respond to the above general proposition as well as other specific questions underlying Hardie's position and their own experiences as testifying experts. After participants answer directed questions, the format will allow for directed discussion between participants. Finally, the chair will attempt to articulate the common ground and differences between positions and solicit comments from the audience.

© All rights reserved Rhoades et al. and/or Human Factors Society

1994
 
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Lovvoll, David R., Laughery, Kenneth R., Wogalter, Michael S. and Terry, Stephanie A. (1994): Risk Perception Issues in the Use of Motorized Shoulder Belt/Manual Lap Belt Systems. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 38th Annual Meeting 1994. pp. 456-460.

Two experiments employed surveys to address seat belt experience and use as well as perceptions of risk associated with various seat belt configurations. In Experiment 1, a questionnaire was administered to two samples: 104 students at the University of Houston and 162 volunteers at a shopping mall in Raleigh, North Carolina. Of primary interest was the use of manual lap belts in motorized shoulder belt systems and reasons for their use or non use. Results showed that compared to manual three point belts, usage rates for manual lap belts in the motorized system were lower. Forgetting and traveling a short distance were frequency cited as reasons for not fastening belts. Estimates of fatalities in a head-on collision scenario indicated lap belts and shoulder belts were perceived to provide equal protection. In Experiment 2, 147 students at the University of Houston completed a follow-up questionnaire. Usage patterns were virtually the same as in Experiment 1. Estimates of likelihood to use lap belts after viewing six different warnings about seat belt use showed warnings containing more explicit hazard information were likely to lead to higher use rates.

© All rights reserved Lovvoll et al. and/or Human Factors Society

 
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Laughery, Kenneth R., Wogalter, Michael S. and Young, Stephen L. (eds.) (1994): Human factors perspectives on warnings : selections from Human Factors and Ergonomics Society annual meetings, 1980-1993. Human Factors and Ergonomics Society

1992
 
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Laughery, Kenneth R., Young, Stephen L. and Rowe, Anna (1992): Swimming Pool Diving Accidents: Human Factors Analyses of Case Study Data. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 36th Annual Meeting 1992. pp. 598-602.

As many as 350 serious spinal cord injuries occur in the United States every year as a result of diving into swimming pools. While there is substantial data on the demographics of injured divers and the events surrounding their injuries, there has been little analysis of the human factors issues associated with this type of accident. Data from 12 swimming pool diving accidents were analyzed in terms of their human factors issues, and the data revealed a number of consistent findings. By virtue of the fact that pools are fairly common, people generally perceive them to be safe. Compounding this sense of security are several interesting perceptual issues about the water depth and the potential risks. People inherently overestimate distances under water, and this effect is exacerbated by cloudy water. Also, all of the divers in this study were young males, who tend to be excessively optimistic and who hold an unrealistic sense of control over potential hazards. This characteristic of male divers was substantiated by the fact that, even when they knew the water was shallow, they unsuccessfully attempted a "shallow dive". In addition to these perceptions and control factors, there appears to be a lack of appreciation of the hazards associated with diving into swimming pools. Quadriplegia or death are not commonly perceived to be a consequence of diving. Several suggestions are offered which could lead to a reduction in the number and magnitude of swimming pool diving accidents. One approach is to provide an appreciation of the hazards and consequences associated with diving so people can exercise reasonable judgment about when and where to dive.

© All rights reserved Laughery et al. and/or Human Factors Society

 
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Jackson, Andrew S., Osburn, Hobart G., Laughery, Kenneth R. and Vaubel, Kent P. (1992): Validity of Isometric Strength Tests for Predieting the Capacity to Crack, Open, and Close Industrial Valves. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 36th Annual Meeting 1992. pp. 688-691.

Cracking, opening, and closing valves are physically demanding tasks required of chemical plant process operators. This study determined if isometric strength tests predicted the capacity to: 1) crack valves; and 2) fully open or close them. The study involved three interrelated steps: 1) complete task analyses to define the torque required to crack valves and the total amount of work required to open or close industrial valves; 2) develop valve turning simulation tests; and 3) complete laboratory studies to define the level of isometric strength demanded for valve turning performance. A total of 405 valves at two major chemical plants were measured to find the torque required to crack, open, and close industrial valves. These data were used to develop two job simulation tests, one measured valve cracking capacity, and the second the endurance needed to open or close a valve. An electronic torque wrench measured valve cracking capacity in eight different ways, and a valve turning ergometer measured the subject's endurance to work for 15 minutes at a power output of 1,413.5 foot-pounds/minute. The sum of isometric grip, arm lift, and torso lift strength tests ({Sigma}IS) measured strength. The isometric strength and endurance work valve tests were administered to 26 men and 25 women. The isometric strength and valve cracking tests were administered to a second sample of 118 men and 66 women. The correlations between {Sigma}IS and work test performance were 0.65 and 0.83 for valve cracking and valve endurance tests respectively. Logistic regression models defined the strength level needed to crack valves and completely close valves.

© All rights reserved Jackson et al. and/or Human Factors Society

1991
 
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Laughery, Kenneth R. (1991): Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Government Mandated Alcoholic Beverage Warning. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 35th Annual Meeting 1991. p. 440.

 
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Godfrey, Sandra S., Laughery, Kenneth R., Young, Stephen L., Vaubel, Kent P., Brelsford, John W., Laughery, Keith A. and Horn, Elizabeth (1991): The New Alcohol Warning Labels: How Noticeable Are They?. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 35th Annual Meeting 1991. pp. 446-450.

 
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Jackson, Andrew S., Osburn, Hobart G., Laughery, Kenneth R. and Vaubel, Kent P. (1991): Strength Demands of Chemical Plant Work Tasks. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 35th Annual Meeting 1991. pp. 758-762.

 
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Jackson, Andrew S., Osburn, Hobart G. and Laughery, Kenneth R. (1991): Validity of Isometric Strength Tests for Predicting Endurance Work Tasks of Coal Miners. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 35th Annual Meeting 1991. pp. 763-767.

 
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Laughery, Kenneth R. and Brelsford, John W. (1991): Receiver Characteristics in Safety Communications. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 35th Annual Meeting 1991. pp. 1068-1072.

1990
 
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Laughery, Kenneth R., Mayer, David L. and Vaubel, Kent P. (1990): Tire-Rim Mismatch Explosions: Human Factors Analyses of Case Studies Data. In: D., Woods, and E., Roth, (eds.) Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 34th Annual Meeting 1990, Santa Monica, USA. pp. 584-588.

1989
 
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Laughery, Kenneth R. and Stanush, Julie A. (1989): Effects of Warning Explicitness on Product Perceptions. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 33rd Annual Meeting 1989. pp. 431-435.

A common assumption of manufacturers is that explicit warning labels will deter consumers from purchasing products. This study explored people's reactions to explicit and nonexplicit warning labels, where explicitness refers to how specifically the potential injury consequences were described. 108 subjects completed a 12-item questionnaire for each of nine familiar consumer products. The questions covered the severity of potential injury, product familiarity, product hazards and dangerousness, manufacturer's concerns, and potential purchasing decisions. Results suggest that products are perceived as more dangerous and related injuries as more severe when warnings are explicit. Also, with explicit warnings subjects report that they better understand the hazards, that they are being provided with all the necessary safety information, and that manufacturers are more concerned about safety. There was no clear indication that more explicit warnings either deter people from purchasing a product or increase the likelihood of a purchase.

© All rights reserved Laughery and Stanush and/or Human Factors Society

 
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Vaubel, Kent P., Donner, Kimberly A., Parker, Susan L., Laux, Lila and Laughery, Kenneth R. (1989): Public Knowledge and Understanding of Overhead Electrical Power Lines: A Second Look. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 33rd Annual Meeting 1989. pp. 560-564.

Public knowledge and understanding of the hazards associated with overhead power lines were examined in the greater Houston, Texas area. A 1988 public opinion survey was conducted as a follow-up to a similar 1982 survey which found the public to be ill-informed about power lines. Partly as a result of these 1982 findings, the Houston Lighting and Power Company initiated a public education program aimed at increasing its customers' power line hazard knowledge The program consisted of TV and radio broadcasts, newspaper advertisements, and bill inserts (stuffers). The purpose of the present research was to determine the effects of this educational program. 306 respondents were interviewed by telephone over a two month period. Results of the present survey were similar to those found in 1982 indicating virtually no change occurred in power line hazard knowledge as a result of the safety education program. Specifically, people did not know that power lines are uninsulated, nor did they have an understanding of the amount of electricity transmitted by these lines.

© All rights reserved Vaubel et al. and/or Human Factors Society

1988
 
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Laughery, Kenneth R., Jackson, Andrew S. and Fontenelle, Gail A. (1988): Isometric Strength Tests: Predicting Performance in Physically Demanding Transport Tasks. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 32nd Annual Meeting 1988. pp. 695-699.

A study explored the applicability of a battery of four isometric strength tests to steward, utility and warehouse jobs in a company that services offshore drilling and production facilities in the petroleum industry. The jobs involve frequently transporting materials up stairs, a category of tasks not prominent in situations where these tests have previously been applied. A job analysis established critical task requirements such as procedures, weights, distances, sizes of containers, etc. An experiment was then carried out with 25 male and 25 female subjects. The subjects performed two self-paced job-related tasks: transporting a 15.9 kg box up and down stairs and similarly transporting a 22.7 kg box. Measures included heart rate and amount of work performed, which, along with known task parameters was used to calculate work power. Subjects also performed four standard isometric strength tests: grip, arm lift, back lift and arm press. Correlations between job task and strength performance indicated these tests are applicable to jobs with such requirements, thus extending the generalizability of the strength test battery.

© All rights reserved Laughery et al. and/or Human Factors Society

1987
 
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Mayer, David L., Jones, Scott F. and Laughery, Kenneth R. (1987): Accident Proneness in the Industrial Setting. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 31st Annual Meeting 1987. pp. 196-199.

The central notion of the accident proneness concept is that people exposed to equivalent hazards do not have an equal number of accidents. If people were equally accident prone, one would expect accidents to be distributed according to chance. Using accident data collected at Shell Oil Company's Manufacturing Complex in Deer Park, Texas, the present study explored the proneness concept for major (OSHA recordable) and minor accidents by comparing the observed distribution of accidents to a chance distribution. The database contains information on 7131 accidents which occurred between 1981 and 1986. The methodology used to create expected values employed a Poisson distribution and assumed that accidents are distributed randomly among the population at risk. The minor accident data was also analyzed by job family. Chi-square analyses of the differences between the expected and observed distributions were found to be statistically significant, including within each job family. The data for minor accidents indicates a striking difference between the expected and actual distributions. Many more people suffered repeat accidents than would be predicted by chance. Approximately 3.4% of the employees accounted for 21.5% of the accidents. While the differences for major accidents was statistically significant, these results are not nearly so striking. The statistical effects are largely due to five employees who were involved in three major accidents in the five year period. In the context of this very large industrial setting, the problem of individuals having repeated minor accidents is significant and merits attention in developing safety interventions.

© All rights reserved Mayer et al. and/or Human Factors Society

 
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Lozada-Larson, Susana R. and Laughery, Kenneth R. (1987): Do Identical Circumstances Preceed Minor and Major Injuries?. In: Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 31st Annual Meeting 1987. pp. 200-204.

The identical causation hypothesis contends that identical causes or circumstances precede minor and major injuries in accidents. Tests of the identical causation hypothesis were carried out by examining frequencies of prior activities, accident events and injury events across minor and major injuries, including a breakdown by job family. Also, combinations of accident variables (scenarios) for minor and major injuries were examined. For the individual accident variables, the data clearly support a similar causation hypothesis. However, for the combinations of accident variables, differences were discerned between minor and major injuries. Overall, the present test of the identical causation hypothesis suggests that similar preceding circumstances may underlie both minor and major injuries.

© All rights reserved Lozada-Larson and Laughery and/or Human Factors Society

 
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Page maintainer: The Editorial Team
URL: http://www.interaction-design.org/references/authors/kenneth_r__laughery.html

Publication statistics

Pub. period:1987-2011
Pub. count:20
Number of co-authors:34



Co-authors

Number of publications with 3 favourite co-authors:

Michael S. Wogalter:5
Kent P. Vaubel:5
Stephen L. Young:4

 

 

Productive colleagues

Kenneth R. Laughery's 3 most productive colleagues in number of publications:

Michael S. Wogalte..:60
Michael J. Kalsher:20
Lila Laux:12
 
 
 
May 19

Design can be art. Design can be aesthetics. Design is so simple, that's why it is so complicated.

-- Paul Rand, 1997

 
 

Featured chapter

Read the fascinating history of Wearable Computing, told by its father, Steve Mann

Read Steve's chapter !

 
 

Help us help you!